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Abstract
For more than half a century, members of the European Union (EU)
have pursued policies aimed at reducing the cost of cross-border trans-
actions. Using a closed-form solution for the non-linear gravity system
of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) we find that Internal Market
policies have created trade between EU members, while diversion of
trade with non-members has been limited. Around 1995, 18 percent of
total trade by EU15 countries can be attributed to the Internal Mar-
ket. In the second half of the 1990’s the European advantage started
to deteriorate relative to other trade flows: in 2005 the contribution
of the Internal Market was just 9 percent. Most enlargements of the
EU have had a positive impact on trade.
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1 Introduction
Since 1958 the European Union and its predecessors1 have adopted various
policies with the intention of reducing the cost of trade between member
states. Apart from lowering tariff barriers these policies also comprise har-
monization of regulation in areas related more to domestic policy. Europe’s
Internal Market2 can be regarded as the most far-reaching free trade area in
the world.
We estimate a time-varying treatment effect of the Internal Market (IM)
using the theoretical framework introduced by James Anderson and Eric van
Wincoop (2003). Our results contribute to the literature in three respects.
First, the theoretical model allows us to take into account trade diversion.
When an FTA is formed or extended this is not only likely to create trade
between its members, but can also adversely affect trade between members
and non-members due to trade diversion. Ignoring trade diversion leads to
upward biased estimates of the consequences of trade policies. We find that
diversion of international is limited, around 2 percent of the trade between
members and non-members in 2005.3
Second, we trace the effect of EU-membership over time, taking general
globalization trends as a baseline. Besides giving a more detailed picture of
how the IM performed over time, our panel approach leads to more robust
estimates when compared to cross-section studies. We find that the IM has
had a positive effect on total trade by its members, but that this effect has
declined since 1995. In 2005 the contribution of the Internal Market was just
9 percent.
1The European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1958 and became
part of the newly formed European Union (EU) in 1993. The European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) was established in 1951 and was also replaced by the EU.
2Alternatively known as the “common market” or “Single Market”.
3Within the framework of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) the total value of all
transactions in the world economy is constant in a given year. The aggregate value of
international trade can only increase if the total value of domestic transactions decreases
correspondingly.
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Third, we explore the effects of EU enlargements. The entry of Denmark,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973 is responsible for 5 percent of trade
by the EU15, while 3 percent can be ascribed to the accession of Portugal and
Spain. We do not find a positive effect for the enlargement by ten countries
of 2004, but this can be due to the fact that our data sample ends in 2005.
There are two approaches to estimating the treatment effect of free trade
agreements (FTAs) like the Internal Market (IM). The first approach im-
poses a theoretical model and was introduced by Anderson and Van Win-
coop A-vW, who studied the effect of the border between Canada and the
United States (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). Scott Baier and Jeffrey
Bergstrand (2009a) have applied this methodology to FTAs. Where they
use a linear approximation to A-vW’s non-linear system of multilateral re-
sistance terms, we use a closed-form solution that allows for asymmetry in
the multilateral resistance terms. The second approach relies on economet-
rics to isolate treatment effects. This route is followed by Egger, Egger and
Greenaway (2008), Magee (2008), and Baier and Bergstrand (2009b).
Although theoretically-founded estimates of the treatment effect of FTAs
are a recent development, ad-hoc estimates have been around much longer.
Tinbergen (1962) already used a gravity equation to study the effect of free
trade agreements (FTAs) on trade. He concluded that FTAs had an econom-
ically insignificant effect.4 Some later studies produced different outcomes.
Abrams (1980), Aitken (1973) and Brada and Mendez (1985), for example,
found an economically significant positive impact of FTAs. However, their
conclusions are not supported by Bergstrand (1985), Frankel et al. (1995)
and Frankel (1997).
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest that these mixed results stem from
a failure to account for the endogeneity of FTAs: countries that trade inten-
sively are also likely to form FTAs. Without correcting for FTA-endogeneity,
4He might have been right: the Internal Market and other FTAs were still in their early
phases at the time.
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they report that FTAs boost trade by just 14 percent. After correcting for
endogeneity, they find that an FTA almost doubles the trade between mem-
bers. We follow their recommendation of including country-pair fixed effects.
Closely related to this literature are studies specifically focusing on the
EU. Frankel (1997) notes that the effect of EU-membership fluctuates over
time and that pooling data from 1970 to 1992 yields an EU effect of 16
percent. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) find effects of the EU12 ranging be-
tween 34 and 60 percent depending on sample and year. The baseline gravity
equation of Baldwin and Rieder (2007) implicitly yields an EU-effect of 51
percent.
The introduction of the Euro also received much attention. After Frankel
and Rose (2002) claimed that common currencies triple trade between mem-
bers, a number of studies followed. Rose and Stanley (2005) provide a meta-
analysis of these studies. More recent papers are due to Baldwin (2006),
Barro and Tenreyro (2007), and Serlenga and Shin (2007). Bun and Klaassen
(2007) argue that panel estimates of the Euro-effect are generally too large
because they fail to account for trends in bilateral trade. They show that
the Euro effect disappears after allowing for pair-wise trends. Berger and
Nitsch (2008) arrive at a similar conclusion. In Appendix D we show that
our approach to estimating the IM effect is not sensitive to their critique.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The theoretical framework is
introduced in Section 2, where the technical details related to counterfactual
trade flows are deferred to Appendix A. Estimation results are presented in
Section 3. The post-estimation results regarding the impact of the Internal
Market on European trade flows are analyzed in Section 4. Here we separate
trade creation from trade diversion. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theoretical framework
A simple way of testing the hypothesis that membership of the EU leads to
lower cost for trade with other members, is to compare the trade between
EU-members with trade flows for which at least one of the trading partners
is not a member of the EU.
There are two reasons why such a straightforward approach can lead to
false conclusions about the effect of the IM on trade. First, the precision of
such an approach hinges on the proper inclusion of control variables. The
second has to do with trade diversion: the creation of the IM is likely to have
influenced trade outside the IM as well. We will return to trade diversion
later on and proceed with a discussion on control variables.
If not all factors influencing trade can be controlled for, the estimate of
the IM-effect can be biased. For two reasons, this bias is likely to persist even
when controlling for size of the economies, distance, common borders, lan-
guage, colonial relationships, etc. First, trade between two countries depends
not only on the characteristics of those two countries, but also on the char-
acteristics of other countries (Anderson, 1979). Australia and New Zealand,
for example, trade more with each other than can be judged from the dis-
tance between the two nations. The geographic isolation of New Zealand
with regard to the large economies elsewhere in the world, enhances the
attractiveness of Australia as a trading partner.
Second, countries do not join free trade agreements (FTAs) randomly.
Instead, the decision to form an FTA depends on factors like geographical
proximity and cultural similarities. Some of these factors can be approxi-
mately controlled for using easily accessible data, but Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) argue that this is not the whole story. For an FTA to make sense there
need to be policy-related barriers to trade otherwise signing an FTA would
be a purely ceremonial affair. Trade between FTA-members is not necessar-
ily larger than trade between countries that do not need to form an FTA
because the latter may already have few policy-related trade barriers. Com-
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paring the trade between FTA-members with other trade flows thus leads to
underestimation of the benefits of the FTA, unless all policy-related trade
barriers are adequately controlled for.
It is possible to avoid problems caused by unobserved control variables
by means of panel data estimation techniques. Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
show that bias due to omitted time-invariant controls can be prevented by
adding fixed effects for each pair of trade partners. Drawback of this approach
is that all time-invariant factors are lumped together, such that the effect of,
say, distance on trade can no longer be isolated.
The second problem why comparing trade between IM-members with
other trade flows leads to a biased estimate of the effect of the IM has to
do with trade diversion. When two countries establish an FTA this will
not only intensify the trade between them, but will also change other flows.
By making trade with non-members less attractive FTAs not only lead to
trade creation, but also cause trade to be diverted from non-members towards
members. Going one step further, the consequences of an FTA extend even to
trade between non-members as trade between a member and a non-member
is partly replaced by trade between non-members.
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) have proposed a method for esti-
mating the effect of the border between the United States and Canada on
trade between US states and Canadian provinces. Building on the framework
of Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985), they derive trade flows for the
counterfactual situation in which the border between the United States and
Canada would not induce trade costs of any kind. As the method proposed
by A-vW can be used for all kinds of trade cost, it can also be applied to the
IM. Just like A-vW estimate the trade cost for cross-border trade relative to
the trade cost of intra-national trade, we evaluate the trade cost within the
IM relative to the trade cost outside of the IM.
The framework of A-vW rests on two main assumptions. The first is that
a country’s production is fixed for a given year. The total value of a country’s
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exports can therefore only change if the value of domestic transactions moves
in the opposite direction. Within the theoretical framework, creation of
international trade will coincide with a reduction of intra-national trade.
The second main assumption is that each country produces a single type
of final good, which is unique to that country.5 The purpose of this assump-
tion is that exports from one country are imperfect substitutes for the exports
from another country. Let cij be the consumption of goods from country i
in country j and assume that consumers in country j maximize utility u as
defined by a CES utility function
uj =
(∑
i
(cij/βi)
(σ−1)/σ
)σ/(σ−1)
(1)
subject to the budget constraint∑
i
pijcij ≤ yj (2)
The parameter βi allows for differences in preferences and the quality of
goods across countries, σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods, yi is
a country’s income, and pij is the price of goods produced in i for consumers
in j. The price of a good is different for consumers in different countries
because of trade costs. If pi is the domestic price of goods produced in i,
then pij is the domestic price multiplied by a trade cost factor τij.
pij = piτij (3)
A-vW show that this framework leads to a ‘gravity equation’ explaining
bilateral trade from the size of the trading economies relative to the size of
the world economy yW , the trade cost factor specific to the pair of countries,
5Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) weaken this assumption by introducing sectors in
which each country produces a distinct variety.
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and two multilateral resistance terms Πi and Pj.
xij =
yiyj
yW
(
τij
ΠiPj
)1−σ
(4)
The larger the multilateral resistance terms are, the less attractive it is for
countries i and j to trade with third countries. High multilateral resistance
terms relative to the costs of trade between i and j therefore imply more
trade between these two countries.
Each multilateral resistance term is a non-linear function of the multilat-
eral resistance terms of the other countries, their share of the world economy
and the trade cost factors:
Π1−σi =
∑
j
P σ−1j
yj
yW
τ 1−σij (5)
P 1−σj =
∑
i
Πσ−1i
yi
yW
τ 1−σij (6)
If the IM has reduced the cost of trade between members of the EU, then—
controlling for other factors—trade costs are lower for all country pairs for
which both trading partner are members. A basic specification of trade cost
that captures the IM effect is:
τijt = b
1−EUijtεij . (7)
Here, EUijt is a dummy variable that equals one if both country i and country
j are members of the EU at time t and zero otherwise. b − 1 is the tariff
equivalent for trade flows that (partly) fall outside of the IM and εij captures
the effects of all time invariant factors influencing the trade cost for the pair
ij.
We use the last four equations to estimate the effect of the IM on trade.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the parameter b is
estimated and in the second step, trade flows are computed for the counter-
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factual situation that the IM would not exist. The method we use with the
second step employs a closed-form solution for the system formed by (4), (5),
and (6). The technical details can be found in Appendix A.
There are several methods for estimating b in a way consistent with
the theoretical framework. The simplest method is to estimate the grav-
ity equation with the multilateral resistance terms replaced by dummies for
each country-year combination. This “dummy method” yields unbiased es-
timates, but is not the most efficient approach. Our main estimates and
post-estimation results rely on this method.
Other methods involve solving the non-linear system of resistance terms.
A-vW use non-linear programming to get a solution for the system. Baier and
Bergstrand (2009a) proceed by taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the
system and substitute the resulting linear approximations of the resistance
terms into the gravity equation. They labeled their method Bonus Vetus
(“good old”) OLS because it avoids the non-linear programming used by
A-vW and allows for estimation with standard econometric procedures. A
third way involves the closed-form solution of Appendix A. The resulting
expressions for the resistance terms can be used in the gravity equation, which
can subsequently be estimated by OLS. We compare alternative estimation
methods in Appendix D.
3 Estimation results
To estimate the effect of the IM on trade, we use panel data on bilateral trade
for 38 countries and subcontinents for the period between 1961 and 2005.6
The use of panel data has two advantages. First, it allows us to follow
the IM-effect over time. Second, using fixed-effects for each pair of trading
partners reduces bias due to the endogeneity of IM-membership by taking
into account time-invariant omitted variables. The empirical equivalent of
6A description of the data can be found in Appendix B.
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the gravity equation using the dummy method is given by
lnxijt = a0 + a1 ln (yityjt) + a2EUijt + eit +mjt + ηij + φijt (8)
In the expression above a2 = (σ − 1) ln b captures the effect of EU mem-
bership. The disturbance terms eit andmjt capture exporter-year and importer-
year specific effects and ensure that the estimated parameters are not bi-
ased because of multilateral resistance. In addition, they absorb variation
caused by yW that is not absorbed by the constant a0. The unobserved time-
invariant characteristics of trade between i and j is captured by the pair wise
fixed effects ηij, which is a transformation of εij.
Equation (8) can be estimated using least squares. However, the residuals
are likely to be heteroskedastic, clustered and autocorrelated. By estimating
the covariance matrix as suggested by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) it is possible
to avoid biased and inconsistent standard errors for the coefficients. The
country-year specific effects are implemented by including dummies. Because
adding dummies for each combination of country and year in addition to
the pair wise fixed effects leads to a large loss in the degrees of freedom
and is computationally taxing, country dummies have been constructed on
a biennial basis.
3.1 Average effect of the Internal Market
Estimation results for the average effect of EU membership are presented in
Table 1. Column (1) refers to equation (8). The log of trade is regressed on
“GDP”, which is the log of the exporter’s GDP plus the log of the importer’s
GDP, and a dummy equal to one if both countries are a member of the
EU and zero otherwise. Pair wise fixed effects and biennial exporter and
importer dummies are included, but are not reported. The coefficient for the
EU dummy of 0.33 reveals a positive and statistically significant effect of EU
membership on trade between members of the EU.
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[Table 1 about here.]
Models (2) to (5) add various other indicators to the basic specification:
a dummy on EFTA membership, a dummy for all trade between Central and
Eastern European countries (CEEC) and non-CEEC countries that occurred
before 1990, and a Euro dummy.
Inclusion of these dummies hardly changes the coefficient for EU member-
ship. The coefficient on EFTA has the expected sign, but is not statistically
significant. In regression results not reported here, the EFTA dummy has
been split up for different cohorts. Also these dummies were not significant.
This outcome is somewhat unexpected as EFTA countries can be considered
to be participants in the IM—at least partly. The story of the EFTA, how-
ever, is different than that of the EU as the EFTA has lost members to the
EU on several occasions. EFTA members for which the potential gains of
EU membership are large are likely to have left EFTA earlier than countries
for which these gains are smaller. This selection process could have had a
downward effect on the EFTA dummy.
The CEEC dummy is negative and large, which is a reflection of the Iron
Curtain. The effect of using the Euro as a common currency is zero.7
Including a single dummy for EU captures the effect of IM averaged over
time and countries. In the next two subsections we will loosen both restric-
tions. Below, we will first allow the EU effect to vary over time. After that,
we turn to the effects of new member states entering the IM.
3.2 The effect of the Internal Market over time
IM policies, as well as global trading conditions, have changed over time.
Therefore, the trade cost advantage of the IM relative to the rest of the world
might also have changed. The relative depth of the IM can be estimated by
7The absence of a Euro effect is in line with the findings of Bun and Klaassen (2007)
and Berger and Nitsch (2008).
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replacing the EU dummy of the previous empirical models with a flexible
time trend (or “linear spline”) which allows a change in slope at several fixed
points in time.
Table 2 contains the estimates for such an EU spline. We have divided
the period 1961-2005 into six intervals. A separate coefficient is estimated
for each interval, indicating the slope for that period. Note that a negative
slope does not necessarily mean that the IM-effect is negative, but only that
the IM-effect is declining. For example, the variable for the first interval
starts with zero in 1961 and increases by 1/45 per year to 10/45 = 0.2 in
1970. From that year onwards the variable remains constant at 0.2. The
variable for the second interval is zero before 1971, increases to 3/45 in 1973
and keeps that value for the subsequent years. Intervals are chosen after
visual inspection of results from rolling pooled regressions (this is explained
in Appendix C).
The results reveal that the impact of the IM has varied substantially over
the years. The largest coefficient is found for the early stages of the IM,
indicating a positive slope of the EU trend. The lowering of tariffs between
the six founding members of the EU seems to have stimulated trade between
them markedly. The advantage of EU membership suffered a backlash in the
first beginning of the 1970s, as the slope of the EU trend is strongly negative
for the period between 1970 and 1972. (We will see in Section 4 that this
steep decline did not last long enough to let the IM effect become negative.)
Between 1973 and 1983, the Internal Market got back on track with a
slope of 0.85. Between 1984 and 1991 the effect of the IM remained roughly
constant as coefficients are small and not significantly different from zero.
The lead of the IM over the rest of the world declined after 1992, first slowly,
later more rapidly. A possible explanation for this finding is intensified glob-
alization, which makes intra-EU market regulation less exceptional. The
global agreements made under the Uruguay Round of the GATT came into
force on January first 1995, leading to a world-wide reduction in tariffs and
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non-tariff barriers. The coefficient on the dummy for Central and Eastern
Europe remains strongly negative.
[Table 2 about here.]
3.3 Enlargement of the Internal Market
During the period 1961 to 2005 the EU has expanded five times. The first
enlargement occurred in 1973 with the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland
and Denmark. The fifth enlargement took place in 2004 and included ten
countries from Central Europe.
The consequences of entry can be identified by adding a dummy for each
of the five cohorts of entering countries. Each dummy is equal to one for
all trade flows that are new to the IM and zero otherwise. For example, the
dummy EU7-9 equals zero for all trade flows before 1973 and one for all intra-
IM trade where United Kingdom, Ireland or Denmark are either importer or
exporter. Thus, after 1973 not only exports from Ireland to Denmark get a
one, but also the imports by the United Kingdom from France.
Table 3 displays the regression results with indicators for each cohort of
entrants. All coefficients have the expected sign and, except for the enlarge-
ment to EU25, all coefficients are statistically significant. This means that
almost every enlargement of the EU has raised the level of intra-IM trade
with the new members. The small coefficient (0.08) for the enlargement to
25 members is not unexpected because it is based on data from only two
years, 2004 and 2005. (Visual inspection of the data suggests that it takes
about ten years before a country is fully adjusted to the IM.)
The coefficient on a cohort dummy is an average over the time period since
that cohort entered the IM. Especially for the earlier enlargements of the EU,
these coefficients will pick up some of the deepening of the IM. The reported
coefficients are likely to overestimate the contribution of enlargement to trade
and can be considered upper bounds on the enlargement effect.
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[Table 3 about here.]
4 Counterfactual trade
How would the exports and imports of EU members be affected if there
would have never been a common market? Although the regression results
presented above give an idea of the role played by the IM, additional analysis
is required to make a distinction between trade created by the IM and trade
diverted by it.
A first question which needs to be answered is whether the IM actually
has created trade or whether it has merely diverted trade with non-members
to trade within the IM. Figure 1 shows how the openness of the EU15 has
changed over time.8 The figure is based on the spline estimate of Table
2. The top line is the actual openness, while the second line refers to the
counterfactual situation without the IM. The bottom line is the difference in
openness with and without the IM (right hand axis).
Without the IM, the openness of the EU15 would not have grown as fast as
it has. Our method implies that at the beginning of our data set the estimated
IM-effect is zero. Over the years the IM has contributed increasingly to
openness, but in the last decade the difference has become smaller.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The first peak in the contribution of the IM occurred around 1970. In this
year the share of trade attributable to the IM was 11 percent. A sharp drop
immediately afterward stabilized in 1973 at 6 percent. A second increase
occurs in the second half of the 1980s culminating in a peak around 1995.
At that time the IM contributed approximately 22 percent of openness. Af-
ter 1995 the IM-effect started to decline gradually eventually arriving at 9
percent in 2005.
8Openness is defined here as the sum of a country’s total exports and imports of goods
divided by value added in non-service sectors.
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The top panel of Table 4 displays the share of the EU15 exports that can
be attributed to the IM. The first row reports that in 2005 10 percent of all
exports by the EU15 were attributable to the IM. The second row shows that
for the entire period from 1961 to 2005 the IM has on average been responsible
for 13 percent. The other rows refer to sub-intervals. The bottom panel of
the table displays the outcomes for imports. The first column containing the
total effect shows a sharp increase in the IM-effect in the early stages.
Another issue is how the IM has created trade: by reducing trade cost
between existing members (deepening) or by giving more countries access to
the IM (enlargement). The second and third column of Table 4 contain the
effects for deepening and enlargement of the IM, respectively. Although it
is not possible to distinguish between deepening and enlargement in a single
specification,9 we use the estimates of Table 2 to calculate the counterfactual
trade flows without enlargement of the IM. Deepening can then be approxi-
mated by the difference of the overall effect and the enlargement effect.
The impact of EU enlargement on exports proved to be more durable
than the impact of deepening. In 2005 enlargement has been responsible
for the entire effect of the IM.10 Deepening has been a substantial factor in
the second half of the 1980s, but its contribution has weakened in the years
thereafter.11 For imports enlargement has been equally influential.
The last three columns consider three important enlargements in isola-
tion. Just like it is possible to study what would have happened without the
IM, it is also possible to compute counterfactual trade flows assuming that
9In principle, a spline can be included in the regression for each cohort of trade flows.
The problem of this approach is that the coefficients obtained in this way are strongly
influenced by intra-EU trade diversion. The A-vW method requires that only variables
are included that directly affect trade cost; the effects of trade diversion should be captured
by the biennial exporter and importer dummies.
10The enlargement effect might be overestimated in 2005, because coefficients for en-
largement are not allowed to vary over time. The resulting deepening effect might therefore
be underestimated.
11It is possible that the coefficients capturing enlargement also include some deepening
effects.
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only a specific enlargement would not have occurred, while the other enlarge-
ments remain in place. The first column shows that the enlargement to nine
members is responsible for 5 percent of EU15 trade in 2005. The accession of
Spain and Portugal has had an effect of 3 percent; the enlargement to fifteen
member states contributed 2 percent.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 5 decomposes the IM-effect into trade creation and trade diversion.
Where Table 4 referred to changes in aggregate trade, Table 5 distinguishes
between intra-IM trade and extra-IM trade. The first column refers to the
share of actual intra-EU15 trade that can be attributed to the IM. The second
and third columns apply EU15 exports to non-members and EU15 imports
from non-members, respectively. Over the entire period, extra-EU15 exports
and imports would have been 3 percent higher without the IM. Trade diver-
sion was largest in the period from 1973 to 1991, about 5 percent. Compared
to trade created by the IM, however, trade diversion has been small.12 Over
the years, trade creation was at least a factor 6 larger than trade diversion.
[Table 5 about here.]
12Within our approach, a net creation of international trade comes at the expense of
domestic transactions.
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5 Concluding remarks
We have estimated how the Internal Market has affected trade over time,
taking into account trade diversion using the framework of Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003). We find that the Internal Market appears to have
stimulated trade between members substantially, while trade diversion has
been small. The impact of the IM on the imports and exports of European
countries has varied over time. The first stage of the IM was characterized
by a elimination of internal tariffs, culminating in a peak contribution to EU
trade of about 11 percent of actual trade in 1970. After this first peak, the
contribution of the IM to trade dropped sharply to 6 percent in 1973.
A second peak of was reached in 1995, a few years after the Single Market
was formally completed. At this time the share of trade attributable to the
IM was about 18 percent for EU-members on average. During the last decade
of our data sample, the impact of the IM declined again to 9 percent in 2005.
All enlargements of the EU have had a positive impact on trade with new
members. The accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom has
had the most profound impact (5 percent of EU15 trade), while the impact
of the 2004 enlargement has been small. This may be due to the fact that
in the data sample the EU25 only exists for two years. Overall, enlargement
of the EU is estimated to be responsible for 10 percent of EU15 exports and
imports.
The Internal Market did have a negative effect on trade with non-members.
The magnitude of this effect was small compared to the trade created within
the IM. Trade creation was about six times larger than trade diversion.
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A Closed-form solution
The theorem below shows that the right-hand-sides of (5) and (6) can be
rewritten as the product of geometric means, yielding a log-linear system of
equations.
Theorem 1 Provided that (4) holds, the system formed by (5) and (6) is
equivalent to the system formed by
ln Πi = −
n∑
j=1
wij lnPj +
1
1− σ (lnNi + ln Θi) + lnTi (9)
lnPj = −
n∑
i=1
w˜ij ln Πi +
1
1− σ
(
ln N˜j + ln Θ˜j
)
+ ln T˜j (10)
where wij = xij/
∑n
h=1 xih , w˜ij = xij/
∑n
h=1 xhj, Nj ≡
∏n
i=1w
−wij
ij , N˜j ≡∏n
i=1 w˜
−w˜ij
ij , Θj ≡
∏n
i=1 θ
wij
i , Θ˜j ≡
∏n
i=1 θ
w˜ij
i , Tj ≡
∏n
i=1 τ
wij
i , and T˜j ≡∏n
i=1 τ
w˜ij
i .
Θ and T are export-weighted geometric means of expenditure and trade cost,
respectively. N is the anti-log of Shannon’s entropy and can interpreted as an
index of exported product variety (Straathof, 2007). The indexes decorated
with a tilde use import shares as weights.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, (5) and (6) can be written
as (9) and (10) with wij ≡ P
σ−1
j θjτ
1−σ
ij∑
h P
σ−1
h θhτ
1−σ
ih
and w˜ij ≡ Π
σ−1
i θi
1−σ
ij∑
h Π
σ−1
h θht
1−σ
hj
. Second,
wij = xij/
∑n
h=1 xih and w˜ij = xij/
∑n
h=1 xhj if (4) holds.
Step 1. Take logs in (5) and multiply by
∑n
h=1wih = 1,
ln Π1−σi = ln
(
n∑
j=1
P σ−1j θjτ
1−σ
ij
)
n∑
h=1
wih . (11)
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Within brackets, multiply by P σ−1h θhτ
1−σ
ih /P
σ−1
h θhτ
1−σ
ih to get
ln Π1−σi =
n∑
h=1
wih ln
 P σ−1h θhτ 1−σih
Pσ−1h θhτ
1−σ
ih∑
j P
σ−1
j θjτ
1−σ
ij
 . (12)
Apply the definition of w and rearrange.
ln Π1−σi =
n∑
h=1
wih ln
(
P σ−1h θhτ
1−σ
ih
wih
)
(13)
ln Π1−σi =
n∑
h=1
wih ln
1
wih
−
n∑
h=1
wih ln
(
P 1−σh
)
+
n∑
h=1
wih ln θh
+ (1− σ)
n∑
h=1
wih ln τih (14)
ln Πi = −
n∑
h=1
wih lnPh +
1
1− σ (lnNi + ln Θi) + lnTi (15)
The same procedure can be repeated for (6), with a tilde indicating import
weights or import weighted index:
lnPj = −
n∑
h=1
w˜hj ln Πh +
1
1− σ
(
ln N˜j + ln Θ˜j
)
+ ln T˜j (16)
Apply the definitions of N , Θ and T in order to complete Step 1 of the proof.
Step 2. Take the share of the value of exports to j in the total exports
of region i and substitute for x using equation 4.
xij∑n
h=1 xih
=
yiyj
yw
(
τij
ΠiPj
)1−σ
∑n
h=1
yiyh
yw
(
τih
ΠiPh
)1−σ (17)
Let the Πi and yi cancel out and use θj ≡ yj/yw to get
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xij∑n
h=1 xih
=
P σ−1j θjτ
1−σ
ij∑n
h=1 P
σ−1
h θhτ
1−σ
ih
= wij . (18)
The same steps can be repeated for w˜, with Pj and yj canceling out.
The system formed by (9) and (10) can be written in matrix notation as[
ln Π
ln P
]
= −
[
0 W
W˜′ 0
][
ln Π
ln P
]
+
1
1− σ
([
ln N
ln N˜
]
+
[
ln Θ
ln Θ˜
])
+
[
ln T
ln T˜
]
(19)
with W being a matrix of all wij and W˜ being a matrix of all w˜ij .
The matrix
[
I W
W˜′ I
]
is rank deficient, such that there is no unique
solution for
[
ln Π
ln P
]
. Formulated in general terms, solving Ax = b for x
yields a set {x} containing an infinite number of solutions. In the empirical
application, the solution with the minimum norm xmin is selected from this
set. As the generalized inverse A∗ has to be computed without knowledge of
b, the generalized inverse being used corresponds to the solution xˆmin = A∗I,
with x = xˆminb. The advantage of this approach over other normalizations
is computational robustness and precision. Using a generalized inverse, a
solution for ln Π and ln P can be obtained in terms of σ and the indexes.[
ln Π
ln P
]
=
[
I W
W˜′ I
]−1(
1
1− σ
([
ln N
ln N˜
]
+
[
ln Θ
ln Θ˜
])
+
[
ln T
ln T˜
])
(20)
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With the system solved, an expression for ln
(
Π1−σi
)
and ln
(
P 1−σj
)
is
readily available.
ln
(
Π1−σi
)
= w¯i
([
ln N
ln N˜
]
+
[
ln Θ
ln Θ˜
]
+ (1− σ)
[
ln T
ln T˜
])
(21)
ln
(
P 1−σj
)
= w¯j+n
([
ln N
ln N˜
]
+
[
ln Θ
ln Θ˜
]
+ (1− σ)
[
ln T
ln T˜
])
(22)
Here, w¯i is the i-th row vector of the inverted matrix. Solutions for ln
(
Π1−σi
)
and ln
(
P 1−σj
)
can be inserted into (4), such that a reduced-form equation
now summarizes the system formed by (4), (5) and (6):
lnxij = ln
(
yiyj
yw
)
+ (1− σ) ln τij
− (w¯i + w¯j+n)
([
ln N
ln N˜
]
+
[
ln Θ
ln Θ˜
]
+ (1− σ)
[
ln T
ln T˜
])
(23)
This reduced form gravity equation can be estimated using linear regression
under the assumption that τ is a log-linear function of observed variables.
The first two terms on the right-hand-side are traditional components of the
gravity equation, while the last term is new and contains the multilateral
resistance effects. The vectors w¯i and w¯j reflect that multilateral resistances
can be different across regions.
First-order treatment effects are obtained from the reduced form by set-
ting the τij’s to their counterfactual values. The resulting trade flows are
used to update the weights in a second iteration. This procedure is repeated
until trade flows have converged to their counterfactual values.
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B Data
Data on bilateral trade were obtained from the International Trade in Com-
modity Statistics (ITCS) database using the OECD’s website. The ITCS
database is maintained by the OECD and the UNSD. Data on all countries
was retrieved and most developing countries were aggregated by (sub-) con-
tinent in order reduce the number of zero trade flows and to focus on the
OECD. As a rule reported imports were used as the primary source. When
a country did not report any imports for a specific partner, the exports re-
ported by the partner were used in stead.
An important exception to this rule has been made for all intra-EU trade
flows from 1992 onwards. The establishment of the Single Market in that year
had the side effect that data on intra-EU trade no longer could be collected
from customs forms. Instead, trade statistics are gathered from data on
value-added tax, the so-called INTRASTAT methodology. Due to sensitivity
to fraud and other factors, intra-EU trade statistics suffered (and still suffer)
from under-reporting. Because reported imports turn out to be more affected
by underreporting than reported exports, the latter kind of data were used
as a primary source for intra-EU trade from 1992 onwards. (In many cases,
underreporting was so large that reported exports even exceeded reported
imports despite the cif/fob difference.) The median cif/fob ratios in the
years immediately prior to 1992 were used to correct for this exceptional
treatment of INTRASTAT data.
The primary source for data on nominal GDP and value added is the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) CD rom (edition 2008).
For several (including European) countries, the WDI does not contain data
on GDP in the earlier years of the sample. In particular, no GDP data was
reported for West Germany prior to 1971. In these cases, additional data
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database was used to
lengthen the series, scaling the IFS data to avoid structural breaks.
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[Table 6 about here.]
C Choice of spline intervals for trade in goods
In Section 3 regression results are presented employing a spline (a “flexible
trend”) for EU-members. The choice of the years at which the slope of the
spline is allowed to change is determined ex-ante and influences the precision
with which IM-effect is measured. Estimating a cross-section gravity equa-
tion for all years separately can give an idea of how the EU-membership has
affected trade over the years. A repeated cross-section, however, turns out
to produce coefficients on the EU-dummy that are highly volatile.
A less volatile alternative is a so-called rolling regression. This involves
estimating a (pooled) regression on a fixed number of subsequent years or
“window”, shifting the window for each regression by adding a later year to
and dropping the first year from the previous sample. A rolling regression is
thus similar to a moving average.
Figure 2 shows the results of a rolling regression of bilateral trade on
the log of importer GDP plus the log of exporter GDP, the log of distance,
dummies for common-border and common language, and an EU dummy.
The figure shows the estimated coefficient of the EU dummy for a three-year
window, a five-year window, and a seven-year window. The vertical lines
indicate the chosen breakpoints for the slope of EU spline.
After the observed peak in 1970, a steep decline sets in until 1974. A
possible explanation for this trough is the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971,
which reintroduced exchange rate volatility for the major trading economies.
These results are robust to including a generic dummy for the years 1971 to
1974.
[Figure 2 about here.]
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D Robustness estimation
Bun and Klaassen (2007) criticized studies of the effect of the Euro on trade
(e.g. Frankel and Rose, 2002) for their failure to take into account trends
in residuals. If residuals of a gravity equation exhibit an upward trend, then
including a dummy for a discrete event, like the introduction of the Euro, will
have a positive coefficient even when the discrete event has had no impact on
trade. Bun and Klaassen showed that the introduction of the Euro has had
hardly any effect on trade once a trend was added for each pair of countries.
The case of the IM, however, differs from the case of the Euro as the
construction of the IM has not been a discrete event, but a gradual one.
Including pair wise trends would not work when measuring such a gradual
effect because most genuine IM-effects would be filtered out.
Nevertheless, the criticism of Bun and Klaassen implies that any trend in
the residuals should not be larger for EU-members than for other countries.
Figure 3 displays the average residuals per year for EU6 countries and for all
other countries. The underlying regression model has a spline for all members
of the EU (Table 2). The figure shows that there is no trend in the mean
residuals of EU6 countries, nor for the mean of the rest. The mean residuals
are higher for the EU6 because of the inclusion of pair wise fixed effects.
[Figure 3 about here.]
All estimation results presented in the main text relied on biennial coun-
try dummies as a means to control for multilateral resistance. It is also
possible to transform variables prior to estimation as proposed by Baier and
Bergstrand (2009a) and above in Appendix A. Table 7 compares the dummy
method in column (1) with the asymmetric closed-form transformation in col-
umn (2), Baier and Bergstrand’s GDP-weighted transformation (BVO-GDP)
in column (3), Baier and Bergstrand’s n-weighted transformation (BVO-n) in
column (4). The transformations proposed by Baier and Bergstrand perform
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very well in terms of estimation efficiency and have coefficients close to those
of the dummy model.
[Table 7 about here.]
The countries chosen for the base sample are mainly OECD countries and
Middle and Eastern European countries (see the first two columns of Table
6). All other trade flows are aggregated by (sub-) continent for two rea-
sons. First, in this way a set of relatively homogeneous countries is created,
such that bias due to unobserved country characteristics is limited. Second,
because it reduces the number of zero-trade flows.
In order to test for the sensitivity of our main results, the base sample is
extended with the major developing countries (listed in the third column of
Table 6). Table 8 repeats the regression results of Table 7 for the extended
sample. The coefficients on the EU spline are closer to zero than those
for the base sample. Do these results suggest that using the base sample
leads overestimation of the EU effect? Not necessarily. A number of large
developing countries have experienced rapid economic growth in combination
with substantial trade liberalization. This has stimulated trade with and
between these countries. Failure to control for this process of catching up is
likely to have blurred the EU effect in regressions using the extended sample.
[Table 8 about here.]
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Figure 1: Openness of EU15, with and without the Internal Market
Notes: The solid line shows actual openness of the EU15, measured as the sum of exports
and imports divided by GDP. The dashed line refers to openness computed using counter-
factual trade flows based on the regression of Table 2 and the post-estimation procedure
detailed in Appendix A. The dotted line (right axis) shows the relative difference between
the other two lines in percentages.
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Figure 2: Rolling regression results for windows of 3, 5 and 7 years
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Table 1: Regression of log bilateral trade on bilateral EU dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP 0.51∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
EU 0.33∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
EFTA 0.13 0.12
(0.09) (0.09)
CEEC −2.02∗∗ −2.02∗∗
(0.17) (0.17)
EURO −0.01 −0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
N × T 51586 51586 51586 51586 51586
N 1406 1406 1406 1406 1406
parameters 1630 1631 1631 1631 1633
R2-adj. 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets;
stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% and **1%. Country-
pair fixed effects and biennial exporter and importer dummies included,
but not reported.
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Table 2: Regression of log bilateral trade on EU spline
period coefficient s.d.
GDP 0.50∗∗ (0.05)
EU 1961-1969 2.35∗∗ (0.23)
1970-1972 −4.22∗∗ (0.98)
1973-1983 0.85∗∗ (0.29)
1984-1991 0.18 (0.25)
1992-1997 −0.24 (0.38)
1998-2005 −1.11∗∗ (0.29)
CEEC −2.01∗∗ (0.17)
N × T 51586 number of parameters 1636
N 1406 R2-adj. 0.85
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brack-
ets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% and **1%.
Country-pair fixed effects and biennial exporter and importer dum-
mies included, but not reported.
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Table 3: Regression of log bilateral trade on EU cohort indicators
cohort coefficient s.d.
GDP 0.50∗∗ (0.05)
EU EU7-9 0.56∗∗ (0.04)
EU10 0.19∗∗ (0.03)
EU11-12 0.48∗∗ (0.05)
EU13-15 0.25∗∗ (0.05)
EU16-25 0.08 (0.05)
CEEC −2.02∗∗ (0.17)
N × T 51586 number of parameters 1635
N 1406 R2-adj. 0.85
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brack-
ets; stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% and **1%.
Country-pair fixed effects and biennial exporter and importer dum-
mies included, but not reported.
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Table 4: Share of EU15 exports and imports due to the IM
Years Total effect? Deepening† Enlargement‡
All cohorts EU7-9 EU11-12 EU13-15
Exports
2005 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
1961-2005 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01
1961-1969 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
peak 1970 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1970-1972 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
through 1973 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00
1973-1983 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00
1984-1991 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00
1992-1997 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.01
peak 1995 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02
1998-2005 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
Imports
2005 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
1961-2005 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01
1961-1969 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
peak 1970 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1970-1972 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
through 1973 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00
1973-1983 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00
1984-1991 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00
1992-1997 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.01
peak 1995 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.02
1998-2005 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02
?Total effect is based on the EU spline estimates of Table 2.
†Deepening is approximated as the total effect minus the enlargement effect for all cohorts
jointly.
‡The enlargement effect is reported for all enlargements since 1973 jointly (“All cohorts”);
for enlargement from EU6 to EU9 (“EU7-9”); for enlargement from EU10 to EU12 (“EU11-
12”); for enlargement from EU12 to EU15 (“EU13-15”). The last three columns assume
that all earlier and later enlargements did take place. The enlargement effects are based
on the estimates shown in Table 3.
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Table 5: Trade creation and trade diversion
Years Intra-EU15 trade EU15 exports EU15 imports
to non-EU15 from non-EU15
2005 0.16 -0.02 -0.02
1961-2005 0.25 -0.03 -0.03
1961-1969 0.20 -0.01 -0.01
1970-1972 0.29 -0.02 -0.02
1973-1983 0.24 -0.04 -0.04
1984-1991 0.31 -0.05 -0.05
1992-1997 0.30 -0.02 -0.02
1998-2005 0.21 -0.03 -0.03
Notes: The data in the table are shares of actual trade flows.
Calculations are based on the EU spline estimates of Table 2.
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Table 6: List of countries and aggregates
Australia Malta Extended sample:
Austria Netherlands Argentina
Belgium & Luxembourg New Zealand Australia
Bulgaria Norway Brazil
Canada Poland Chile
Cyprus Portugal China
Denmark Romania India
Finland Spain Indonesia
Fmr. Czechoslovakia Sweden Mexico
Fmr. USSR Switzerland & Liechtenst. South Africa
Fmr. Yugoslavia Turkey Sri Lanka
France & Monaco USA, PR, & Virgin Isds. Suriname
Germany United Kingdom Thailand
Greece Venezuela
Hungary Aggregates: Zimbabwe
Iceland East Asia and Pacific
Ireland Latin America and Caribbean
Italy, SM, & V Middle-East and North Africa
Japan South Asia
Korea, Rep. of Subsaharan Africa
37
Table 7: Estimation results for transformed variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.50∗∗ −0.86∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.62∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
EU 1961-1969 2.35∗∗ 3.34∗∗ 2.29∗∗ 2.62∗∗
(0.23) (0.36) (0.28) (0.26)
1970-1972 −4.22∗∗ −6.26∗∗ −4.83∗∗ −5.31∗∗
(0.98) (1.18) (1.01) (0.89)
1973-1983 0.85∗∗ 0.67 0.95∗∗ 0.89∗∗
(0.29) (0.42) (0.25) (0.22)
1984-1991 0.18 1.62∗∗ −0.08 0.10
(0.25) (0.40) (0.23) (0.21)
1992-1997 −0.24 −2.99∗∗ −0.95∗∗ −0.44
(0.38) (0.53) (0.27) (0.32)
1998-2005 −1.11∗∗ −1.29∗∗ −1.46∗∗ −1.46∗∗
(0.29) (0.49) (0.23) (0.30)
CEEC −2.01∗∗ −0.53 −1.73∗∗ −1.59∗∗
(0.17) (0.40) (0.55) (0.55)
Transformation none closed form BVO-GDP BVO-n
Exporter-year dummies yes no no no
Importer-year dummies yes no no no
Year dummies no yes yes yes
N × T 51586 51586 51586 51586
N 1406 1406 1406 1406
parameters 1636 52 52 52
R2-adj. 0.85 0.67 0.76 0.76
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets;
stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% and **1%.
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Table 8: Estimation results for extended sample of countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.47∗∗ −0.75∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.63∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
EU 1961-1969 1.14∗∗ 3.61∗∗ 0.39 1.92∗∗
(0.35) (0.46) (0.61) (0.41)
1970-1972 −2.96 −4.78∗∗ −2.25 −3.14∗
(1.75) (1.35) (2.58) (1.45)
1973-1983 1.47∗∗ 0.82∗ 0.91 0.55
(0.54) (0.39) (0.68) (0.34)
1984-1991 0.76∗ 0.38 1.24∗∗ 0.61∗
(0.34) (0.31) (0.43) (0.30)
1992-1997 0.25 −2.61∗∗ −0.44 −0.31
(0.40) (0.46) (0.40) (0.34)
1998-2005 −0.82∗ −0.00 −0.95∗∗ −0.53
(0.36) (0.47) (0.33) (0.28)
CEEC −1.58∗∗ −0.37 −1.57∗∗ −0.90∗∗
(0.16) (0.34) (0.55) (0.32)
Transformation none closed form BVO-GDP BVO-n
Exporter-year dummies yes no no no
Importer-year dummies yes no no no
Year dummies no yes yes yes
N × T 88819 88819 88819 88819
N 2550 2550 2550 2550
parameters 2208 52 52 52
R2-adj. 0.75 0.57 0.63 0.63
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag one between brackets;
stars indicate statistical significance levels: *5% and **1%.
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